01
Context and Current Storage Gap
West Asia-related disruptions have highlighted India's energy-security vulnerability. India currently has 5.33 MT underground SPR capacity at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur, though actual storage is only about 3.37 MT. Phase II of 6.5 MT is approved at Chandikhol and Padur but remains delayed. LPG underground capacity is just 0.14 MT, and India has no operational underground natural-gas storage.
02
Core Analysis: Capacity, Inventory, and LNG Nuances
The proposed 9 MT LNG reserve equals about 56 days of LNG imports, not total gas consumption. The PNGRB-ICF 2030 stress test estimated only 0.56-0.6 MT LNG equivalent for 20 days of priority supply, achievable with about eight tanks at $1 billion. LNG is stored cryogenically at about -162°C and must be regasified before underground storage. A separate ministry proposal requires LNG terminals to keep storage 10% above normal operating needs.
03
Scaling Challenges: Crude, LPG and Natural Gas
Crude storage is the most mature segment; the U.S. SPR shows how an integrated network of caverns, pipelines and terminals works. Scaling LPG from 0.14 MT to a proposed 4 MT reserve would need many new caverns, terminals, pipelines and bottling infrastructure. Natural gas would require depleted reservoirs or salt caverns, demanding site selection, cap-rock integrity checks, cushion gas and pipeline connectivity. Potential basins include Krishna-Godavari, Cambay, Mumbai Offshore and Rajasthan.
04
Deliverability: Shipping and Pipelines
Storage alone cannot guarantee supply. State-run refiners and Shipping Corporation of India plan a $1.5-2 billion joint venture to acquire 59 ships. Indian Oil is diversifying via 2027 Algeria agreements, increased U.S. purchases and direct stakes in Very Large Gas Carriers. PNGRB has authorised about 1,800 km of LPG pipelines across six States at $0.7 billion to improve deliverability, though pipelines do not add strategic storage by themselves.
05
Future Outlook: Financing, Governance and the Way Forward
The reported $42 billion programme is unconfirmed and combines infrastructure CAPEX with inventory purchase. The government has denied a cess for funding. Key policy gaps remain: ownership and financing of inventory, minimum stock obligations, emergency-release authority, and replenishment risk. A commercial-cum-strategic model could reduce public burden. The ultimate test will be coordinating reserves, shipping, pipelines and governance simultaneously during a crisis.